My first day in Dubai, I went to lunch with one of the executives of the Telco.  During our lunch, I asked him how they manage encrypted connections.  He explained that they were currently getting ready to deploy a solution to solve that.  The infrastructure was being upgraded to decrypt all SSL sessions and parse the data as required.   Aside from opening my eyes to the difference in privacy between North America and the Middle East from a privacy perspective, I found it interesting that SSL decrypting was so easily available.   Previously, I had seen software that law enforcement used for this purpose.  I myself had done it for clients using available tools during a engagement.  But these tools were designed more for targeted surveillance, not mass scale.  Like all technology, it improves and gets less expensive over time I guess.

Today, there are many more companies in North America and abroad that either have deployed SSL decrypting capabilities or are in the process of doing so.  Security, diagnostics, audit and legal requirements to know what is coming and leaving their networks and being able to log and trace back data transmissions to the originator are some of the reasons.  One driver is Data Leakage Protection (DLP), currently a very ‘hot’ topic with many new vendors jumping on the opportunity with solutions.  In order to look for data leakage, you need to see past any encryption that might be present.  Cisco, Bluecoat, PaloAlto, Fortinet are just a few companies that offer products for SSL decryption.

With Google deploying encryption for Gmail and more recently searching, plug-ins such as the EFF Firefox plug-in to help secure your communications, companies are feeling more and more concerned about what data is coming and going.  What worries me is that all these security, legal and audit requirements companies face are actually not helping them in the long run.   If these companies are decrypting SSL sessions that egress and ingress their network, you can be sure that other companies are doing the same to theirs.  The net result is that everything is decrypted and no one has any privacy.

Next time you connect to your bank, doctor’s office, insurance company, Gmail or any site and see secure indications from your browser similar to these

along with the companies re-assurances that the site is secure, keep in mind things may not be as they appear – today even more so than yesterday.

Do you deploy any type of decryption on your network?  If it is deployed are you aware of it?

photo credit

I reviewed a report where it was indicated that because the data was encrypted it was impossible to determine anything useful.  This is not always the case, but I have seen this conclusion in reports and investigations many times when dealing with encrypted or unidentified data.  Aside from the marketing which says that if my Internet sessions are encrypted then one is safe (nothing could be further from the truth), many network administrators do not understand or have had much experience with behavioural profiling.  Behavioural profiling of networks can be very complex, and research is relatively new in this area.  To give some insight into how one might profile network sessions and show how one can use behavioural profiling to extract information, I decided to walk through a simple example and answer a simple question.  Specifically, what are the differences between an encrypted network session where one is watching a program or video (user providing no input), compared to an interactive type of network session where one is interacting (providing input)?  I used the SSH protocol to illustrate.

I used video over SSH to watch a program.  The program was approximately 24 minutes in duration and was hosted on a server at my ISP.   There were no problems watching the program, it didn’t pause or stop, and it was just like watching a typical television program (in fact I watched it on my flat screen TV).  I used a device to capture the traffic between the server hosting the program and my home for the entire duration of the program.  Finally, I captured an interactive SSH session which was me logged into a server at my ISP, where I was doing some coding and some shell commands.

Attempts to look at the actual data of either of these captures will be useless.  Since the data is encrypted, without access to the session keys knowing what was transmitted is close to if not impossible.  That being stated, what behaviour characteristics can we observe to tell us what might be going on?

I separated the direction of each of two captures which gave me 4 capture files, video received, video transmitted, interactive data received and interactive data transmitted.

Bandwidth

Looking at the chart above, the video watching has a much larger amount of data received than transmitted compared to the interactive session where a similar amount of data is transmitted and received.  Analysis of most video streaming and flows where downloading is occurring will yield a similar results.  The ratio of received to transmitted data will be high.  Interactive sessions tend to have a more balanced ratio of transmitted to received data compared to a video session.  This of course has dependencies on what the user is doing in the interactive session, but typically this has been the case in my experience.

Inter-packet timing

Another interesting metric is the time difference or delta between two packets.  Watching a video or listening to music, the delta between two packets tends to be small in comparison to an interactive type of session.  There are a few reason for this.  Since the video is being viewed, it is important to ensure that the data arrives in a timely manner so as to not have the video ‘freeze’ while being watched.   Some software attempts to write the video data to disk in advance of viewing to help mitigate this problem, but that leaves an exposure where an savvy individual can obtain a copy of the video by simply making a copy of the temporary file.  As a result, newer software tends to attempt to keep the data in memory and not write it to disk.  The result is the need to ensure a smooth delivery of data, minimizing delay between packets (known as Jitter).

I wrote a simple python script which will take as input a capture file, calculates the inter-packet timing for each pair of packets and then outputs among other information, the results you see in the table above.  The Maximum field is the largest time between packets, the mean is the average time between packets, and the standard deviation is a measure of how ‘different’ the inter packet times are from the ‘normal’.  For those that don’t know or wish to have a refresher in standard deviation, here is a good place to start. However, most languages and spreadsheets have functions to calculate this for you if you do not wish to learn the math.  In simple terms and using our specific example, if all the packets had the exact same time between them then the standard deviation would be 0.  The greater the difference in timing between packets, the greater the standard deviation will be.

Notice that the standard deviation is much higher for the interactive session then the video session.  Sessions that stream data, tend to have a low standard deviation for inter-packet timing.  If you think about it this makes sense, as an interactive session you can walk away from the computer, or the program could be waiting for input from the user so data transmission will fluctuate more.

Bandwidth, inter-packet timing, and methods such as standard deviation and mean are just a few things that can be used to narrow down what a particular subjects activities might be.  In corporate or law enforcement investigations, profiling network behaviour can be a useful tool to determine if you need to spend more time on the investigation or if you have the right target.  Using our example above,  suppose a corporation wants to determine which employees are watching streaming videos.  A scan of the network data reveals an individual who has encrypted sessions, but these sessions show a transmit / receive ratio that is in line with typical interactive sessions and not video sessions.  Also, the standard deviation of the inter-packet timing is higher for these sessions, then you can rule them out as an individual of interest immediately.  This has the advantage of focusing your investigation, not encroaching on privacy issues unnecessarily,  and saves time by allowing you to focus on the users that have network sessions with characteristics that fit the behaviour you are looking for.

For those of you that feel comfortable because the data is ‘encrypted’ it can be a false sense of security.  These are two of the many metrics and theorems that can be used on the data.  This area has active research and there are many products that will do this type of analysis in an automated fashion.  For those interested in this, although older now, this is a great paper where an experiment was conducted to determine what movie people were watching even though the movie data was encrypted.  They used behavioural data to fingerprint the movies, then applied the fingerprints to encrypted transmitted data.

There has been lots of discussion lately about Flash websites using Local Shared Objects (LSO) to track users selections, browsing habits, and other information.  One of the advantages for websites has been that until now they have not been well known.  From my basic searching they have been around since at least 2004 and probably earlier.  A user may configure their browser to remove or delete all ‘cookies’, but LSOs stay.  According to some, many of the top websites use them.

I tried a little experiment to see how LSOs are stored.  The directory that they are stored varies depending upon your operating system.  For me I use Linux as my primary O/S.  The default directory for LSOs is ~/.macromedia/Flash_Player.

Under the ‘Flash_Player’ there are two directories and under each of these directories are the security configuration and the binary installer for the Flash Air application.  Nothing interesting.  Next, I started Firefox and went to youtube.com and selected a video.  After the video completed, I took another look at the ~/.macromedia/Flash_Player directory.

Under~/.macromedia/Flash_Player we now have two new directories, macromedia.com and #SharedObjects.  If we decend the macromedia.com directory, we find 3 nested single directories called support, flashplayer, and sys respectively.  Under the ’sys’ directory we find a binary file called settings.sol and a subdirectory which is #s.ytimg.com owned by Google.  The #s.ytimg.com directory contains a separate settings.sol which is binary.

Under the #SharedObjects directory, there is a single oddly named directory ‘3BJH4AW6′, then a directory for the website ’s.ytimg.com’, a domain owned by Google.  Below this are two files entitled videostats.sol and soundData.sol, both containing binary data.

I haven’t investigated the format or contents of the .sol files, but it is obviously where the metadata is stored.  I may try to investigate the format or see if anyone else has already figured it out as I am curious.  The bigger question in my mind is how does one properly erase this data.  There is a Firefox add-on called BetterPrivacy which will do just that. It can be configured to delete LSOs on request or remove all the LSOs when you shutdown Firefox.  I installed BetterPrivacy and tried it.  Sure enough, upon shutting down Firefox I was greeted with this window:

Selecting OK, put my ~/.macromedia/Flash_Player directory back to its original state with no LSOs or website directories present.  For the normal user that should suffice.  However, these are files and they have been deleted.  Most people should know that files these days that are deleted are typically still recoverable.   File systems such as NTFS (windows), ext2/ext3 (*nix) all can have files deleted on them recovered.  In the case of ext3, it is a journal file system and the default file system installed on most *nix platforms today.  Without getting into the details in this post, this effectively means that even if you wipe a file it can potentially still be recovered.

If you carry around sensitive information on your laptop, I recommend you create an encrypted volume on your hard drive using a package such as TrueCrypt, PGP.  In the case of my system, I formatted the encrypted file system to be ext2.  This means there is no journaling.  This has the disadvantage of being less ‘recoverable’ but it has the advantage that if you wipe a file with ‘wipe’, ’shred’ or some other wiping software it is unlikely to be recovered.  Next, I point my ~/.macromedia directory to the encrypted file system.

You can see the ~/mndData file which is the truecrypt fileystem.  ~/.macromedia is symbolically linked to the encrypted filesystem.  For those interested, you can see that my Evolution (~/.evolution), Google Desktop (~/.google), Firefox Cache and bookmarks (~/.mozilla), IM client (~/.purple) and Skype (~/.Skype) all write to the encrypted file system.  You have to be able to mount the ~/mndData to get at any of the email, browser cache, bookmarks, IM conversations and now LSOs.  It isn’t fool proof, but it offers another layer of protection so that client data remains unviewable in the event of my laptop being stolen.

http://www.flickr.com/photos/renaissancechambara/349206957/

Just a quick entry as I am busy studying for a two day exam that is this weekend.
Earlier in June, Google posted a response to an open letter on one of their blogs that indicated they are looking into the feasibility having Gmail encryption always on. Other Google applications such as Google Docs can use TLS/SSL, but it is currently not required unless the user specifies it.

Last year Rogers attempted to insert pages and frames into their subscribers browsers when they were surfing, and Google was not impressed.  According to Michael Geist, it is back.

Anyone want to make any guesses as to how long before Google and other web services just turn on HTTPS to stop this and deal with the increased performance requirements?

image by wchulseiee (http://www.flickr.com/photos/wchulseiee/2427418216/)

My laptop is pretty secure. I am not silly enough to think that is is 100% secure or that no one could get into it, but relative to most laptops out there it’s not too bad. There are weaknesses due to time or software requirements, but I think I am aware of most of them. I don’t encrypt the operating system (yet), but all data partitions are encrypted. It has been configured with the goal that all sensitive data and metadata  (web browser, IM, video, audio, cache, bookmarks)  is encrypted.
once data is no longer ‘required it is stored on the servers at the office and then ‘wiped’ off the encrypted drives at regular intervals .    All metadata  is wiped from the encrypted drives each weekend, which gives at most one week of metadata, assuming an attacker can get into the encrypted drives to view it. The main reason for all this is to protect customer data. I like others in my industry work with institutions and their data.  In many cases that data can be politically, financially, or image ’sensitive’ in nature if it was to get into the wrong hands.  Should my laptop ever be stolen, I want to at least make it difficult for an attacker to gain easy access to the data in a reasonable period of time.

Imagine my surprise when I was re-configuring my laptop and I discovered that my deleted file metadata had somehow been reset  to write to a different area, on an unencrypted area of my drive.  The following is a partial view of the files I discovered.  The files went back as far as November, 2008.

Trash Meta Directory on laptop

These are standard text files with information about each file that was deleted.   The information includes the original file location as well as a timestamp indicating when the file was deleted.

Trash meta data file details

Even though the actual data files were not present, there is a lot of information here.  Just from working with the data contained in the files above, one could easily determine names of files worked on, importance, directory structure of encrypted partitions, date file was deleted and more.  You could very easily put together a time line of a customer, projects being worked on, dates of project activity, useful information that can be sold, used to a competing company or party’s advantage in court, for a bid, or a competitive product or service.

There is a lot of ‘negativity’ with Anti-Forensics lately, especially in the forensics community.   Although I understand and appreciate the problems and concerns they have, I believe anti-forensics is necessary and a good thing.   It all depends on who is using it and why.  Needless to say, I have fixed the problem with my laptop, and ‘double checked’ my drive encryption and scripts to ensure correct execution.

The authors (A.Czeskis, D. J. St. Hilaire, K. Koscher, S.D. Gribble, T.Kohno, B. Schneier) note that given the current political environment in many countries today, users of DFS may think that utilizing a DFS application permits the data stored in the DFS to not be discoverable. The authors highlight how this is a false belief.

Two of the key points I found interesting were:

1. Most applications and operating systems are not designed to preserved plausible deniability and often ‘leak’ information that reveals the existence of a DFS.

2. Many common applications such as Microsoft Word make a copy of a file that is located in a DFS, typically in a non DFS and non encrypted location while the user is working on a file. If the application is properly closed, the file is deleted, but not securely allowing a recovery agent to extract the contents of the secret file without need to access the hidden file system.

What I find amusing is there are so many simple ways to smuggle out information from a company that monitoring e-mail seems to be a waste of time and money. One could copy the information to a laptop and download it to a computer at home. Copy the information to a USB key, CD or DVD and take it home. One could print the information out on paper (since most companies don’t monitor what is printed). None of these methods require expensive, or complicated technology. If I wanted to get information out of the office and I even suspected that e-mail, IM or transmissions were being monitored these ways are the simplest and least to arouse suspicion. Unless a company plans to manually search you and your belongings every time you enter or exit the building including checks of laptops, USB keys, and other media investment in technology to monitor e-mail I don’t see the point.

Proofpoint stated that it is often used to watch for employees spending too much time on personal versus work related issues. I suppose this is a valid use, but personally I don’t manage that way and I doubt I would ever work for a company that did manage that way. If people are getting their work done then I’m not going to worry if they send personal e-mail, surf the web or decide to take an extra 10 minutes at lunch. I believe it is important that you can trust your employees and they feel a sense of responsibility towards their work. If this is missing then the company has bigger issues that monitoring e-mail or other flows of information will not solve.

The other concern I have with all this “monitoring” going on is that it will increase the adoption rate of encryption and other stealth technologies . Governments, businesses, and law enforcement wanting to monitor people’s e-mail, web surfing, files shared and download will force software and developers to add encryption and other forms of covert data transmission into the software more quickly. Most E-Mail servers for example have encryption (TLS) support now. As encryption becomes more available in e-mail clients and set to be the default mode of communication the encryption will be transparent to the user. Encryption is something that law enforcement is running into more and more. It hampers their investigations. This is bad when you are actually trying to catch the bad people distributing drugs or child pornography. I picture an Internet where all communication is encrypted or obfuscated in different ways to avoid “monitoring.” What will we do then? Probably have discussions about key escrow,outlawing encryption, and other silly conversations we have had in the past and never worked.

-mike.

Some really cool research done by Princeton University on defeating these forms of disk encryption was published. The paper gets quite technical into key reconstruction and other related math, but the blog entry has a video that shows a recovery procedure, including the use of off the shelf products to sufficiently cool memory to permit data extraction.

I am going to have to try this out on my laptop.