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	<title>Comments on: Tor and plausible deniability</title>
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		<title>By: Clear2Go</title>
		<link>http://michaeldundas.com/2010/02/18/tor-and-plausible-deniability/comment-page-1/#comment-6318</link>
		<dc:creator>Clear2Go</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Feb 2010 20:47:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>&lt;a href=&quot;#comment-6282&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;@JaymeSnyder &lt;/a&gt; 
You could.  I think the differences would be two thing on an unsecured WiFi.  First, the amount of traffic generated on a tor exit node is quite extensive.  Just looking at the URLs on an HTTP stream alone.  The shear amount of traffic I think permits one to hide more easily.  It would be tough to generate that on a open WiFi.    
The second and bigger concern with an open WiFi would be your mac address.  You&#039;d have to be smart enough to randomize it, otherwise it would be in the log as the device associated with an IP that did the following at the following times.  As you know that is easy to do, just have to know to do it.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="#comment-6282" rel="nofollow">@JaymeSnyder </a><br />
You could.  I think the differences would be two thing on an unsecured WiFi.  First, the amount of traffic generated on a tor exit node is quite extensive.  Just looking at the URLs on an HTTP stream alone.  The shear amount of traffic I think permits one to hide more easily.  It would be tough to generate that on a open WiFi.<br />
The second and bigger concern with an open WiFi would be your mac address.  You&#8217;d have to be smart enough to randomize it, otherwise it would be in the log as the device associated with an IP that did the following at the following times.  As you know that is easy to do, just have to know to do it.</p>
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		<title>By: JaymeSnyder</title>
		<link>http://michaeldundas.com/2010/02/18/tor-and-plausible-deniability/comment-page-1/#comment-6282</link>
		<dc:creator>JaymeSnyder</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Feb 2010 21:23:29 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>Could you not say the same about not securing your WiFi?</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Could you not say the same about not securing your WiFi?</p>
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